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ABSTRACT
The sensitivity, environment and response of electric initiators
and their explosive components are discussed and analyzed. Responsiveness
in the natural and packaged states to heat, electrical and mechanical
stimuli are considered. Environment is defined in terms of best available
information on storage temperatures; lightning, radio frequency and static
electricity; and the mechanical stimuli that an EED can receive in normal
shipment.
It is concluded that present ICC regulations consider safety of the
carrier and the general public. These regulations do not provide for the
electrical safety of the devices being shipped nor do they provide completely
for protection of the reliability of the electric initiators.
It is recommended that shielding be provided for initiators in
transit and in storage. Metal foils should be used at once and more
suitable designs for shielding from low-frequencies should be developed
for use in the future to enhance safety and reliability
i
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Goff(1)*the packaging business in the United States
involves expenditures of around 21 billions of dollars each year and
accounts for approximately 4% of the gross national product. This is
slightly more than the contribution to the economy made by new housing
in this country.
Packaging is established as a large business that encompasses many
phases of bringing materials to the customer.
In this study our interest covers only a small portion of the whole
scheme of packaging. We are concerned only in those aspects of packaging
that apply to small electroexplosive devices (EEDs). By small we mean
that the entire explosive contents is on the order of one gram or less.
The main interest in this study is in the safety and reliability
of the EED during packaging, shipping, handling and installation in the
vehicle for which it is intended to serve a function. These concerns
are for the entire shipping and handling history of the device.
The aim of the program was to determine the sensitivity of EEDs
generally to each of the driving forces that may set them off or otherwise
affect them in the process of shipping and handling. Some of these are
shown in Figure i. Concurrently with determining sensistivity, we attempted
to define the environments that could be experienced in normal shipping
practices and in unpacking and handling. Subsequently the effects of these
forces on the initiators were examined by comparing the stimulus that could
be recieved with the sensitivity of the electric initiator in that particular
mode.
Most of the work that was done involved literature reviews and
analysis; however experimental work was performed on static electric effects
_(i) See Bibliography at end of report.
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from anti-static plastics and on propagation of explosive output from one
device to another in selected dunnage materials.
Reviews were made of current packaging practice for electroexplosive
devices as carried out by explosive manufacturers and requirements of the
ICC and other pertinent literature were reviewed in an effort to interpret
the existing rules as they apply to the electroexplosive devices that
we have chosen to call "small".
In a number of areas there appears to be little need for modification
of current practice in packaging for shipment. Current practice by the
explosive manufacturer is generally acceptable and fulfills the requirements
of the ICC regulations for the shipment of EEDs. It is not believed that
these rules are fully understood by all persons, or for that matter even by
a majority of persons who practice shipping of EEDs. This is one reason
for the summary that is contained in Appendix B.
There are areas that cannot generally be defined including the
ability of each EED type to accommodate the energy of impact and both
not fire and be serviceable. Still another area that needs consideration
is the sensitivity of EEDs to electrical energy. Present manufacturers'
specifications call out the "no-fire" current and the "all-fire" current.
While these are certainly necessary, they are of little use in the assessment
of pulses that might be applied to the EED by a lightning discharge or
during the application of static discharges from human operators. Electrical
information on EEDs in general is lacking, sketchy and presented in such
a way that little can be learned of the safety aspects of the EED.
Most of the excitation levels that had to be considered were available.
Transportation information is usually reliable from commercial sources and
this is so because of the wide use of transportation facilities for the
shipment of fragile materials. Similarly the criteria for packaging of
most materials are reasonably well defined for the mechanical characteristics
of devices where the limit of energy to break or harm the packaged device
is known.
3
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Vibration characteristics of the transportation media are also
well known and the criteria for meeting vibration protection can be worked
out readily. Again the characteristics of the initiator are not well known.
Some of the limits of existing initiators are being examined for flight
problems, but not for survival in packaging. The problem here seems to be
minor, however, because the flight requirements are usually far more
stringent than those of transportation.
Electrical hazards are little understood and greatly feared. It
has been recently pointed out (2) that too _uch concern is given the RF
problem and too little that of lightning and static; ther_ is some basis
for disagreement here. There appears to be little enough concern over
all the electrical hazards involved in electroexplosives including those
of RF, static electricity and lightning. All three of these potential
hazards have been considered in this report with respect to the packaging
problem. The broad treatment of the material is forced by the wide ranges
of sensitivity that we can expect from the EEDs involved and from the very
wide variations in frequency, power and pulse conditions from the electro-
magnetic sources and from charged objects and lightning discharges.
Heat and high temperatures have proven to be a problem with most
available electroexploslve devices, Researchers in this area have experienced
difficulty in attempts to sterilize spacecraft using heat (3). A surprising
number of available devices fail when exposed to temperatures around
145°C for periods up to 30 hours. Storage temperatures of this level are
not common, and it is not too probable that they do or will exist in
shipping or storage.
Chemical and humidity effects are not treated extensively in the
literature. "Breathing" of the EED is probably one of the most serious
problems that is encountered with humidlty,and corrosion and fungus are
nearly as troublesome. Chemical effects are usually those of contamination
rather than direct chemical processes within the initiator as long as the
materials contained in the EED are compatible with one another.
4
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The conclusions that are reached within this report, as with
any study of its kind, reveal more problem areas than solutions to
these problems. While we must conclude from experience that present
packaging procedures are reasonably safe, we cannot conclude that they
will continue to be safe in the future with the increasing burden on the
air waves of radar, communication devices and other emitters of electro-
magnetic energy.
While there is some concern over the effects of atomic radiation
on explosive materials, it is generally conceded that the level of radiat±on
and the total dose required to produce these effects is several orders of
(4) For this
magnitude above the level that is lethal to human beings .
reason we have given little consideration to the problem of atomic or
nuclear radiation as a part of normal package requirements.
An attempt has been made to spell out some specifications that
we feel would protect the packaged EED to a greater extent that fs presently
required. Most of the specified conditions are now satisfied in part or
totally by some manufactures. Others are called for in certain of the
programs that are underway for specific vehicles or specific programs.
Some are entirely new and reveal a need that has yet to be demonstrated
by an accident. Intelligent and carefully planned handling of EEDs in
protected environments will solve some of the problems that are involved
in handling and operating with EEDs; but procedures alone cannot be con-
sidered a satisfactory solution to safety in all cases.
Examination of the ICC regulations for shipping and packaging (5)
will point out that these regulations are intended to protect the carriers
and the general public from harm as a result of an accident with
hazardous materials. The intentions of these regulations are well taken
and such requirements that have been set down must be met. These regu-
lations do not go far enough for reliability or safety in today's problem
areas.
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If one is shipping a reefing cutter, for example, the package
requirements are relaxed to the point where it could be free to move in
the package. There are practically no requirements on dunnage and the
component could conceivably be damaged by the stresses received in shipping.
The same applies to a number of other devices that are not dangerous to
the point that they create explosive output. Fortunately manufacturers
are usually very aware of the quality of their product and make an effort
to provide the best type of package to protect the product they sell until
it is used.
This report contains three sections that deal with sensitivity
environment and response. The first of these, Section 2, discusses what
is known of the sensitivity of EEDs from controlled testing of these de-
vices. The second involves the environment that a package of EEDs may
encounter or that an EED may encounter in handling. The third treats
the response of the EED and the package system to the environments defined.
Section 5 contains a discussion of the problems connected with
packaging electroexplosive devices and indicates some possible solutions
to these problems. Section 6 indicates conclusions that have been reached
as a result of this study and recommends methods by which some of the
problems characteristic of packaging EEDs may be further understood, reduced
and minimized.
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2. SENSITIVITY AND TOLERANCE LEVEL
2.1 General Failure Modes in EEDs
Wire bridge heating is not the most common mode of failure though
it is the normal firing mode of the EED. Excitation in this mode can cause
accidents or failure of the device to operate normally. If the applied
energy is inadequate to fire the device and yet cause some heating of the
explosive around the bridge_wire it is possible to alter the sensitivity
of the EED. This phenomenon is not fully understood, but concurrent studies
are underway to better describe what happens (6). Previous work establishes
beyond reasonable doubt that prepulsing can severely decrease the sensitivity
of EEDs and dudding has been experienced in some instances due to the
application of pulses giving some indication of the degree of this effect.
A more cormnon problem is to have the device fire prematurely from heating
of the bridgewire.
Pins-to-Case Sparking
Sparking or arcing from the bridgewire leads or from the
bridgewire itself to the case of the initiator in such a way that the
spark path is through some of the primary explosive most generally results
in firing of the EED. The means by which the arc or spark is formed is
usually from electrostatic energy or it may be from radio frequency energy
of the pulsed type that has been observed to occur. Figure 2 shows the
location of some of these phenomena on a cut-away view of a typical electro-
explosive device. Some devices are built in such a way as to contain two
sets of lead wires and two bridgewires for increased reliability through
redundancy. This design introduces the possibility of a spark discharge
from one bridgewire system to another in addition to the one from bridge-
wires to case.
Only in the past few years have users of EEDs and manufacturers
become aware of the problem of excitation of an EED in other than the
THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
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bridgewire mode. Attempts are currently being made to design this problem
out of the electroexplosive device (7). Some success has been noted
recently. It has been increasingly difficult to fire EEDs submitted for
electrostatic testing. This does not mean that all devices currently
in use are immune to static.
Referring once more to Figure 2, it will be noted that sparking or
arcing is shown in three locations. One rather common characteristic
that enhances arcing is an untrimmed portion of the bridgewire that extends
over the end of the pin to which it is welded. Many of the devices that
are most sensitive to static were found to contain this tab. Sharp corners
of the pins themselves also encourage arcing. Arcing from the bridgewire to
the case has been observed with RF excitation. This is probably due to
the fact that the conductive path between pins and case presents a rather
high impedance at many RF frequencies thus causing a relatively high
voltage to appear across it. If the voltage (and power) is great enough
sufficient arcing or current flow may occur to fire the initiator. It
is suspected that in some instances heating of the dielectric materials
in the EED due to RF will cause initiation of the device. This heat
probably comes from dielectric losses in the materials near the explosive
or from the explosive itself as the result of swaying of the dielectric
dipoles or quadrlpoles which is accompanied by heat generation.
These are some of the problems that must be faced in providing
protection for EEDs in the packaged state and in handling during unpackaging
prior to installation of the device.
2.2 Temperature and Heat
By the nature of explosives when they are heated, they react and
yield heat in decomposition. When the heat generated exceeds the heat
losses, the reaction builds to the point where decomposition is sustained
at a high rate. Studies have been made that give the ignition or explosion
9
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temperature for certain explosive compounds. Some of these are shown
in Table i and more are contained in the references cited.
Table 1
IGNITION AND EXPLOSION TEMPERATURES
FOR COMMONLY USED EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS £8'9)''
Explosive Explosion Temperature (°C)
Tetracene 160
Nitrocellulose 170
DDNP 195
PETN 225
RDX 260
Lead Styphnate 282
Lead Azide 240
Popular belief is that heat is the basis of all explosive reactions
regardless of the source of the heat. The systems that may apply this heat,
the volume of explosive being heated, the time of exposure, the confinement
and other factors complicate efforts to define a single value of explosion
or ignition temperature for each material.
The problem of thermal ignition isnot simply one of knowing the
ignition temperatures of the constituent explosive materials, but a knowledge
of the thermal characteristics of the explosives comprising the EED helps.
When the materials are brought together to make up the complete EED, the
thermal characteristics of the explosive materials are not the sole factor
in determining sensitivity to heat. This has been pointed out in several
studies that are recently completed or currently underway.
The General Electric Company (3) has recently studied the ability
of electroexplosive devices to withstand dry sterilization temperatures.
This work was done to assure that such devices could be sterilized by this
I0
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process and still function. Initiators were subjected to three cycles of
temperature from ambient to 145°C and back to ambient, the maximum tem-
perature being held for 36 hours in each of the three cycles. Of the
thousands of commercially available devices surveyed in this study, a ma-
jority contained explosives not able to remain at 145°C without degradation.
Of those remaining there was either insufficient information or the devices
were not immediately available. About two dozen devices were finally tested
in the sterilization process. The criterion for acceptability was that
the device fire after the stated temperature cycle.
It is interesting to observe that the construction of the device
was critical in determining the survivability. Difference between coef-
ficients of thermal expansion, types of materials and adhesive, and means
of explosive retention were found to be important. Failures were opened
and found to have blackened and cracked ignition beads in 75% of the cases.
The remaining failures were due to other mechanisms mentioned. The devices
that did survive showed some of the construction characteristics that are
desirable in EEDs. A welded, flush-mounted bridgewire with a compressed
and well supported charge were found to be desirable. A doped or brushed-
on (spotted) bridge mix was found particularly sensitive to the above
ignition bead deterioration, mainly because of the volatile carriers used
in the preparation of the slurry.
While in no case was an explosivereaction of the material reported
in these tests, it is evident that a majority of currently used electroex-
plosive devices reaching a temperature of 150°C would be generally unreliable
after this kind of exposure if the exposure was for a number of hours. We
feel that shipment and storage temperatures should be limited to 100°C
(212°F) or perhaps even 74°C (165=F) (the old military standard).
Efforts are currently underway to upgrade the heat resistance of
EEDs and other explosive devices and explosive materials (I0) . When some of
these developments are put into practice, the requirements will be more
relaxed for these heat-resistant EEDs; but in the interlm we are faced with
the transportation of existing devices. It is also expected that some of
the conventional EEDs will be in use for some time in the future.
ii
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2.3 Electrical Effects
2.3.1 General Sensitivity to Electrical Stimuli
The problems associated with electric initiators could readily
be translated to those of heat if all of the transfer mechanisms and boundary
conditions could be defined. This is not usually possible, and design
criteria are supplemented by experimental development programs.
Similarly, the sensitivity of electric initiators is usually
characterized experimentally. Wire bridge devices in military use are
usually evaluated in terms of current pulses ranging in time from a few
microseconds through step functions lasting minutes. Current amplitude
is usually varied at one specified pulse time. The shorter the pulse
time, the more current that is required. These data are plotted in the
form shown in Figure 3. Other variables may be plotted such as capaci-
tance vs. voltage or v®itage vs. time. Examination of a number of electric
initiators (II) reveals that the most sensitive wire bridge detonator will
not fire with a continuous current of i0 milliamperes applied. This is
substantiated as a safe level by a number of other studies.
The 10-milliampere current is often used as the maximum measuring
current for instruments that are designed for the measurement of bridge--
wire resistance of electric initiators. It appears that this current is
our only choice for the limiting value of the maximum no-fire current for
wire bridge EEDs in general because of the wide range of sensitivities
possible and found in actual usage.
2.3.2 Static Electricity, Bulk Explosive Materials
The effects of static electric charges on bulk explosive material
was studied previously (9). We feel that the results are still valid and
that little has been added to the knowledge in this scientific area since
the conclusion of the study. The remaining discussion is extracted in
the main part from the referenced report.
12
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It is the consensus of researchers in this field that three factors
are important with respect to the sensitivity of explosives to electrical
discharges: (i) the minimum spark energy required for ignition, (2) the
electrical properties of the materials, and (3) the environment of the
material. In attempting to find the minimum energy required to fire
explosives, it was soon discovered that the sensitlvit±es determined by
a number of experimenters varied greatly. This variation was partly due
to the fact that there was great variation in the methods of determ±ning
sensitivities.
One of the best sources of information (12) included data on a
number of common explosive materials, which are summarized in Figure 4.
The data were obtained by discharging various capacitors charged to
5000 volts through the test material by means of a pointed electrode.
The circuit used was similar to the one shown in Figure. 5. The test
material was placed on a metal plate and the pointed electrode was lowered
until discharge occurred.
Other studies have been made, with a resistance added in series
with the capacitor and gap. A sample of the material under study was placed
within the gap, which was usually a pointed electrode over a flat metal
plate, as described earlier. Some of the values reported from various ex-
perimenters in this area are given in Table 2 (13). Particularly noteworthy
in this table as well as in the text of the referenced report is the effect
of adding series resistance to the firing circuit. For mercury fulminate,
note that as the series resistance is added the energy required on the firing
capacitor decreases rapidly, minimizes, and then increases. It has been
observed that this is the rule rather than the exception for most explosive
materials tested in this fashion, an exception being lead styphnate, which
requires the least energy with no series resistance. A general rule has
been developed relating series resistance, capacity and minimum energy. It
states that the smaller the capacity, the greater the critical series resis-
tance and the lower the minimum energy. The minimum energy requirements for
14
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Fig. 5 - Frequently Used Circuit to Determine the Minimum Energy for
Explosive Ignition
Table 2
MINIMUM ENERGIES FOR IGNITION OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS
Material
Copper Acetylide
Lead Styphnate
Lead Azide
Lead Dinitro-
resorcinate
Mercury Fulminate
Comments on Preparation or
Testing
Basic Preparation
(chemically)
Normal; Energy measurement
depends upon experimenter
Prepared in humidity less
than 0.1%
Prepared in humidity less
than 1.8%
Graphite added in amount of I%
Crystalline
Dextr_nated
Unconfined
Confined
Series Resistance of 5,000 ohms
Series Resistance of 25,000 to
750,000 ohms
16
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Miminum Energy on Firing
Capacitor (Ergs)
2O
3O
140 to 9000
3.8
112.5
0.6
400 to 18,000
70,000 to 280,000
5OO
800,000
200,000 to 250,000
68,000
37_500
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ignition of an explosive material are changed by several orders of mag-
nitude in some instances by the resistance in series with a circuit.
Mr. A. R. Boyle in his thesis at the University of Birmingham, United
Kingdom, (1943) showed a reduction in the ignition energy of mercury ful-
minate from 0.5 joule without any series resistance to 0.00375 joules with
a series resistance of from 250,000 to 750,000 ohms.
This information may pertain to circuits containing electro-
explosive devices as well as to explosively loaded components, and may be
applicable in the pin-to-case testing of electroexplosive devices, or in
the bridgewire-to-bridgewire testing of these devices for static safety•
It has been previously pointed out that the human circuit is not the only
means by which static energy can be delivered to explosive devices. This
information indicates that it may be misleading to determine ignition
energy under one condition of circuit constants for static safety and then
to apply these across the board for all values of capacitance, resistance
and voltage• This is brought out in Figure 6.
!
, !I
! ;/
, !/
Fig. 6 - Response of Typical Explosive Material to Spark Gap
with Series Resistance
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In looking at the values of resistance for which energy requirements
are relatively low, it appears that some are near the leakage resistance
values of certain components. A resistance of 750,000 ohms differs not
greatly from that of a contaminated insulator; and by the "rules" set down
previously, this might be just the value of series resistance for firing
from a small capacitor with minimum applied energy.
Complete Initiators
As was mentioned earlier, any input that can cause heating of the
explosive material directly, without the need to bring a transducer element
such as a wire bridge to temperature can cause firing at much lower energy
values than could be achieved with a transducer (wire bridge). While static
types of sources have caused firing in the bridgewire mode_ it is more
likely that the EED will be activated in the pins-to-case mode. An ex-
amination was made of some of the tests conducted at FIRL in the past.
The results of these tests are summarized inTable 3.
Table 3
MINIMUM STATIC SENSITIVITY OF EEDs TESTED AT FIRL
Contract Reference
Device Noo Capacity Voltage or Code
SD6OAO 500 5000 bridge-to-bridge NAS-5-3878
SD38BO 500 5000 (P to C) NAS-5-3878
SD38AO 500 No fires to 24KV (P to C) NAS-5-3878
SD6OAO 500 No fires to 24KV (P to C) NAS-5-3878
SDIIA2 500 3,500 (P to C} NAS-5-3878
SD6ODI 500 No fires to 25KV (P to C) NAS-5-3878
FND-209 500 1 of 5 at 2KV,I of 5 at 12KV(P to c)
No fires to 25KV (P to C)
NAS-5-3878
S94" 500 NAS-5-3878
(P to C) indicate that the voltage is applied from pins-to-case.
*Langley Research Center has reported some firings of this device under
conditions stated here.
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We are not at all certain, in light of existing information whether the findings
of the studies on bulk explosives can be extended to include EEDs, for
little has been done in evaluating the full effects of static discharges
on EEDs.
All of the documented work to this date indicates studies on complete
electric initiators have been slanted toward personnel borne charges. Little
other work has been found to justify application of findings on bulk
explosives to those of complete EEDs. The main question concerns the
effects of circuit parameters, series resistance and capacitance, on the
firing energy in the pins-to-case mode. From the results experienced by
others (13), it appears that _here may be a critical series resistance for
various EEDs.
2.3.3 Radio Frequencies
At least 43 devices have been fully evaluated for RF sensitivity
at FIRL (14). One of the most sensitive devices tested has a 5% probability
of firing if 87 milliwatts is applied to the input leads (bridgewire). It
is generally true that no device has been found to require less RF power
than dc power for the same functioning probability when the power is
applied CW (continuous wave) through the bridge circuit at frequencies
below i000 MHz. However, when the power is applied pins-to-case or bridge-
to-bridge at higher frequencies the initiators may be considerably more
sensitive to RF than to dc particularly when the RF is pulse modulated.
The initiators may be more sensitive to pulsed RF in the bridgewire mode
(than to dc) due to the thermal stacking effect if the pulse repetition
is faster than the time required for the bridge system to cool (thermal
time constant). Typical radar pulse repetition rates are 800-1000 pulses
per second and typical EED thermal time constants are 1 to i0 milliseconds
so thermal stacking is not an uncommon phenomenon.
In the plns-to-case and bridge-to-bridge modes the sensitivity to
pulsed RF often appears to be primarily a voltage phenomenon, high voltages
19
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being associated with high peak power in the short pulses. If the
impedance pins-to-case or bridge-to-bridge is high at a particular frequency
then high voltages will be impressed and arcing through the explosive
mix is very likely to occur. This is similar to the static electricity
phenomenon, and a trend indicating high correlation between static and
RF-pulsed sensitivities has been observed.
RF problems are as muchinvolved with lead configuration as with
sensitivity of the EED itself. Past experience has shown that initiators
are in themselves sensitive to most frequencies through the x-band and
even beyond.
An important part of the RF problem rests in the "antenna" and its
ability to remove RF energy from the surroundings and deposit the energy
in the EED. This entire picture has been described previously (15) in terms
of antenna aperture that is defined as the ratio of the power deposited in
the load, (the EED), to the power density in the ambient field. This
concept is a tool for evaluation of hazards.
2.4 Mechanical Sensitivity
Individually there is little that has been done in connection with
the sensitivity of electric initiators to impact. Certain military tests,
e.g. MIL-STD 322 require the drop testing of electric initiators from a
40-foot height in a test fixture simulating the fuze body. Requirements
are that the EED does not function and that no samples shall be unsafe
for subsequent handling or disposition.
Electric detonators are used in artillery ammunition that experiences
accelerations in the vicinity of 50,000 G. These devices are expected to
function reliably after experiencing these accelerations.
It is generally agreed that initiation of explosives by impact
is thermal in nature, the explosive being heated by compression of inter-
stitial gas, intercrystalline friction and viscous flow.
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Impact and friction tests have been made on a number of explosive
materials by Picatinny Arsenal in a test apparatus that bears that name.
The test consists of dropping a 2 kilogram weight on an explosive sample
contained in a small steel die cup. A similar apparatus and test technique
has been developed by the Bureau of Mines. The drop height is given as
the sensitivity of a particular explosive and it represents the minimum
height at which at least one of i0 trials results in an explosion.
The sensitivity of explosives to friction is determined by ex-
posing a sample of the explosive to the action of a fiber or steel shoe
attached to the end of a pendulum. A qualitative explanation is given
of the results in the form of explosion (E), snaps (S), cracks(C), or
unaffected (U) in decreasing order of reaction.
The results of these tests on some materials used in electric
initiators is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
IMPACT AND FRICTION SENSITIVITY OF EXPLOSIVES
COMMONLY USED IN ELECTRIC INITIATORS {8)""
Picatinny Arsenal Picatinny Arsenal
Impact Test Friction Test
Explosive Drop Height (in.) Steel Shoe
Lead Azide 3 E
Lead Styphnate 8 E
Cyclonite (RDX) 8 E
PETN 6 C
Tetryl 8 C
Black Powder 16 S
Another form of mechanical energy to which explosives and electro-
explosive devices are sensitive is the output from other explosives and
explosive devices. This means that if one device in apackage is accidently
set off, then the protection provided by the package should prevent continued
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propagation of the reaction. High explosives are tested to find critical
gap dimensions for barriers that are set between the explosive that pro-
vides the impetus (the donor) and the explosive that receives the impetus
from the donor (the acceptor). These distances are difficult to compute
because of the wide variety of physical constants of the explosive materials
(that are usually granular) and because the gap is critically dependent
upon the confinement of both acceptor and donor. Directional properties
of the explosions, dependent on device design, also have a large influence.
Because of these factors, a limited number of tests were made on
the ability of a high-output blasting cap to detonate a small electric
detonator. Results are reported in Section 4.4.
2.5 Summary of Section
(i) Predominant failure modes have been identified by cause:
Pins-to-Case sparking, bridgewire-to-case sparking, heat-
ing of bridgewire from stray electrical energy, uneven
thermal expansion of components from external heating,
and degradation of explosives from external heating.
(2) Problems due to temperature have been discussed and
ignition temperatures of common explosive materials
listed. Supporting studies have been described.
(3) A probable safe current for all wire bridge devices has
been identified as i0 ma.
(4) The sensitivity of some EEDs to static electricity was
examined. Static sensitivities of bulk explosive mate-
rials were examined to broaden the base of application
to EEDs.
(5) The results of radio frequency sensitivity tests have
shown a maximum sensitivity (minimum power) of 87 milli-
watts for 5% firing probability.
(6) Mechanical test methods for bulk explosive materials
have been discussed, and sensitivities for some bulk
materials have been listed. MIL STD 322, covering in
part the drop test for fuzes requires a 40-foot drop
test. Service requirements for some EEDs include
50,000 g acceleration.
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Impact and friction tests have been made on a number of explosive
materials by Picatinny Arsenal in a test apparatus that bears that name.
The test consists of dropping a 2 kilogram weight on an explosive sample
contained in a small steel die cup. A similar apparatus and test technique
has been developed by the Bureau of Mines. The drop height is given as
the sensitivity of a particular explosive and it represents the minimum
height at which at least one of i0 trials results in an explosion.
The sensitivity of explosives to friction is determined by ex-
posing a sample of the explosive to the action of a fiber or steel shoe
attached to the end of a pendulum. A qualitative explanation is given
of the results in the form of explosion (E), snaps (S), cracks(C), or
unaffected (U) in decreasing order of reaction.
The results of these tests on some materials used in electric
initiators is shown in Table 4.
Table 4
IMPACT AND FRICTION SENSITIVITY OF EXPLOSIVES
COMMONLY USED IN ELECTRIC INITIATORS (8)
Picatinny Arsenal Picatinny Arsenal
Impact Test Friction Test
Explosive Drop Height (in.) Steel Shoe
Lead Azide 3 E
Lead Styphnate 8 E
Cyclonite (RDX) 8 E
PETN 6 C
Tetryl 8 C
Black Powder 16 S
Another form of mechanical energy to which explosives and electro-
explosive devices are sensitive is the output from other explosives and
explosive devices. This means that if one device in a package is accidently
set off, then the protection provided by the package should prevent continued
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propagation of the reaction. High explosives are tested to find critical
gap dimensions for barriers that are set between the explosive that pro-
vides the impetus (the donor) and the explosive that receives the impetus
from the donor (the acceptor). These distances are difficult to compute
because of the wide variety of physical constants of the explosive materials
(that are usually granular) and because the gap is critically dependent
upon the confinement of both acceptor and donor. Directional properties
of the explosions, dependent on device design, also have a large influence.
Because of these factors, a limited number of tests were made on
the ability of a high-output blasting cap to detonate a small electric
detonator. Results are reported in Section 4.4.
2.5 Summary of Section
(i) Predominant failure modes have been identified by cause:
Pins-to-Case sparking, bridgewire-to-case sparking, heat-
ing of bridgewire from stray electrical energy, uneven
thermal expansion of components from external heating,
and degradation of explosives from external heating.
(2) Problems due to temperature have been discussed and
ignition temperatures of common explosive materials
listed. Supporting studies have been described.
(3) A probable safe current for all wire bridge devices has
been identified as i0 ma.
(4) The sensitivity of some EEDs to static electricity was
examined. Static sensitivities of bulk explosive mate-
rials were examined to broaden the base of application
to EEDs.
(5) The results of radio frequency sensitivity tests have
shuw_ a maximum sensitivity (minimum power) of 87 milli-
watts for 5% firing probability.
(6) Mechanical test methods for bulk explosive materials
have been discussed, and sensitivities for some bulk
materials have been listed. MIL STD 322, covering in
part the drop test for fuzes requires a 40-foot drop
test. Service requirements for some EEDs include
50,000 g acceleration.
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3. ENVIRONMENT OF ELECTROEXP£OSIVE DEVICES
3.1 General
The environment that an EED experiences during handling and
transportation may include a variety of stimuli. Not only are the forms
of the stimuli different, but the magnitudes of these may vary within
wide ranges. Some of the environments are difficult to describe meaning-
fully because there is a variable factor, individual device and package
desig_ affecting response to stimuli. Effort will be made in Section 4
to take the design variable into account and to bring together the mag-
nitude of the stimulus and the sensitivity of the initiator.
In the present section the environments that can be experienced
will be bracketed with information where available,
3.2 Heat
The heat stimulus that an EED can receive in handling and shipping
varies from very low temperatures to very high ones. Some work has been
done in recording temperatures of storage bunkers in desert areas (17) .
Average maximum and average minimum storage temperatures were recorded in
storage bunkers at NOTS, China Lake California; NAD, Hawthorne, Nevada; and
YPGp Yuma, Arisona. Some of these data were taken over a period from
r---
1957 through 1963. Minimum average temperature was about 32°F at the
Nevada site and the maximum average temperature was about 10_°F at the
Yuma site. Only 3 or four times in the period from 1957 through 1964 did
the temperatures in the storage bunkers exceed II5°F. Open shade storage
areas were found with maximum temperatures around II0°F. This study claims
that the 165°F requirement for storage temperatures is grossly high and
unrealistic with apparently enough data to back up this statement as far
.4
as practfeal Storage fs concerned.
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There appears to be little information on the temperature enviro-
ment of transporting vehicles. Surface temperatures on dark colored
automobiles are high enough to prevent prolonged contact with the palm
of the hand; these temperatures are probably around 150°F. This does not
mean that the entire vehicle storage space or load space is at a high
temperature like the surface of the vehicle. Some moderation of the tem-
perature would be accomplished by the cooler bottom and sides of the
vehicle. Solar radiation probably accounts for most of the extreme tem-
peratures that will be found in storage areas and in transporting vehicles.
The high temperatures resulting from this exposure will probably crest
during the mid-day periods during the summer at temperatures higher than
those reported in the desert storage study. A guess for the extreme
maximum temperature under these conditions would be ahout 16Q°F.
Temperatures in excess of 130°F have been recorded in noninsulated
or nonrefrigerated freight cars in direct sunlight (18).
3.3 Electrical Environment
3.3.1 Lightning Storms
Lightning is the result of an equalization of opposite electrical
charges that have been generated by natural processes. By various means
clouds in the atmosphere accumulate a rather large charge of electricity
that is essentially static, prior to its discharge by a stroke of lightning (19)"
Even in the static state_ a charged cloud can present problems
with explosive materials on the surface of the earth. The charged cloud
has what is known as an image under it on the earth plane that in reality
is not as perfect as one would be led to believe. Charges of polarity
opposite to that o2 the cloud are attracted from parts of the earth to
the points nearest the cloud and hence oSjects in this area are raised
in potential with respect to the average potential of the remainder of
the earth. The static field thus generated could cause problems particularly
where objects that are well earthed are near objects that are not well
earthed. Sudden changes in the condition of the field or in the position
of objects thus charged could cause spark discharges even in the absence
of lightning strokes.
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where
(20)
The magnitude of the electric field is given by:
1.798X i0I0 H 0
E = "o (3-1)
Y (H2 + d2) 3/2
E is the vertical component of the electric field - volts/meter
Y
H is the height of the charge above the ground plane
Qo is the charge on the cloud center - Coulombs
d is the distance from the projection of the charge
on the ground - Meters
Under average conditions, the electric field immediately u_der the
charge center is over 30,000 volts per meter and at distances of 2500
meters the field is over 6,000 volts per meter. Figure 7 shows the dis-
tribution of the electric field with distances for average conditions
(height 2000 meters) as well as for very low clouds (500 meters).
Other means of obtaining dangerously high electrical potentials
or currents in packaged electroexplosive devices include (i) induced or
radiated effects and (2) direct conduction effects from lightning storms.
As breakdown begins from the static cloud center, some of the
charge that was formerly on the cloud forms a column from the cloud center
to the earth. This phenomena occurs rather slowly but the net effect
is to bring the charge closer to the earth's surface with the result that
the vertical electric field increases in intensity. The field is computed
using the charge left on the cloud and the charge that exists in the column
extending from the cloud toward the earth. Under average charge and height
conditions, the field will have the values that are shown in Figure 8.(20)
The time here is shown from the beginning of the leader stroke to the time
that the leader approaches the earth. Distances from 0 to i000 meters
are shown. The magnitudes of this field becomes very high as can be seen
from this curve.
When the leader reaches the earth, a return stroke forms that may
have a velocity of 0.6 that of light. The leader strokes normally have
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a velocity only one or two percent that of light. Currents in the main
or return stroke are on the order of i0,000 to 30,000 amperes on the
average and may attain currents in excess of 150,000 amperes. The result
of the main stroke on the electric field is to immediately neutralize it
as is shown on the right side of Figure 8.
A second effect of the main stroke is to set up potential gradients
in the earth. This is brought about by currents that flow through the
earth to the strike point. This radial electric field is the one that
probably causes most of the 5000 annual deaths attributed to lightning in
the United States. The magnitude of this field is given by:
o v t (3-2)
r z ro Vo _VoT
where
I is the maximum current in the main stroke - kiloamperes
o
r is the distamce from the main stroke - meters
o
v is the velocity of the main stroke - meters/second
v is the velocity of light - 3 x 108 meters/second
o
p is the remistivity of the earth - ohm-meters
Z is the characteristic impedance - 30 ohms
o
t is the time - seconds
T is the rise time of the stroke current - seconds
The phenomena involved in production of the radial electric field
and the magnitude of this field as a function of distance for three values
of earth resistivity are shown in Figure 9. From this figure it can be
seen that the higher electric fields result from higher earth resistivities.
_ ...... _^_ _ o+_° _n_ _hp magnitude ofEven aE a distanc_ of _uuu ,,,=_=_° ..............._, r......
the electric field is over 6000 volts per meter.
The main stroke current also produces a magnetic field. The leader
strokes produce a magnetic field that is almost infinitesimal compared to
that of the main stroke and therefore the main stroke is of most interest
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in this respect.
given by (21) :
The magnetic field resulting from the main stroke is
2 Z I v
B : o o (3-3)
2
v r T
o o
where T is the time from the arrival of the leading edge
of the magnetic field to the time of interest.
When T is greater than T this equation does not apply.
The effects of the magnetic field produced from the main stroke
is illustrated in Figure i0 which is really a summary of the contents of
Appendix A. Shown here is the magnetic field emanating from the main
stroke. The magnltude of the magnetic field as a function of time is
shown, as is the equation for the induced voltage in a closed loop.
Approximations of the potential induced in closed loops of various sizes
for a 150,000 ampere main stroke are shown in Figure A-2, Appendix A.
3.3.2 Static Electricity
Hazards of static electricity are typified by an accident that
occurred on 14 April 1964 at Kennedy Space Center in which ii were in-
jured - two fatally. The electric delay squib was ignited by static and
this caused ignition of an X248 rocket motor. The static charge was gene-
rated during removal of a protective plastic cover from the motor.
Static electricity is perhaps a misnomer as this phenomena applies
to firing electric initiators. Prior to the time that a discharge occurs,
the electric charges are bound on insulating materials or on metallic
components that are themselves isolated electrically and are indeed static.
Static charges accumulate as the result of bringing two materials close
together. There is a contact difference of potential between any two
dissimilar materials. This difference is small when contact is made; but
as the two pieces are separated from one another, the potential soars
because the capacitance is decreased while the charge is conserved. A
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discharge is triggered when the potential becomes high enough. This dis-
charge may contain frequency components into the microwave spectrum.
Contact between two materials if facilitated by work that is done
on the surfaces and often is a contributing factor in the generation of
static potentials. Storage of the charge that is generated is an important
aspect of the mechanism of charge production and transfer. Any object
that has mass also has capacity to earth, and it is this capacity that
is able to store charges that are generated by static means. In most
instances there is enough leakage resistance to the earth to bleed this
charge as rapidly as it is generated; and as a consequence of this leakage,
there is no appreciable rise in the potential of the object. At times,
usually when the relative humidity is very low, the leakage resistance is
large and the charge may accumulate to the point that the potential is very
high. This accounts for the shocks that one receives in sliding across
the vinyl covered auto seats and then touching a metal portion of the auto.
Estimates have been made of the magnitude of the potential that
is possible to achieve on the human being and of the capacitance and leakage
resistance of the human being under different conditlons (22). In addition,
transfer efficiency of switching devices to evaluate the electrostatic
hazard have been assessed.
The potential that a human can build up is critically dependent
upon the shoes that he is wearing and upon the material on which he is
standing. Under conditions where the sole of the shoe is a good insulator
and rather thick, it is possible to store charges at a potential of 20,000
volts or more; this is exceptionally high compared to average conditions.
Under these same circumstances, the capacity would tend to be on the low
side; perhaps i00 to 150 picofarads. Capacity is determined by the size
of the individual and can be estimated by adding half of the height of
the individual in centimeters to the capacitance contributed between the
foot and the earth (23). The result will be in picofarads. Actual measurements
of the capacity of individuals showed extremely high values of capacity to
exist in wet, rainy weather. In one instance the capacity was 1,160,000
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picofarads during wet weather. Leakage was apparent, and it was not easy
to maintain a charge on the individual due to the rapid decay of charge.
Resistance measurements were also made on individuals from wrist-to-wrist,
ankle to wrist and from wrist to ground. There were wide variations in
individuals and in foot ware. It is generally concluded that 500 plcofarads
in series with a 5000 ohm resistor is a fair estimate of the human circuit.
Other than human circuits applicable to static safety of EEDs have
been given little concern. Many of the conveyances for EEDs are large,
insulated from ground, and subject to the generation of static charge
either from frictional means or by induction. Consider a 40-foot trailer
under the same conditions used to calculate human capacitance. The capa-
citance of the trailer due to size alone would be on the order of 600
picofarads. Rubber tires contacting the earth are in effect a self-exclting
Van de Graaff generator with proper conditions. Air containing dust and
sand passing the body of the trailer either due to the motion of the vehicle
or to wind can cause the generation of large potentials on the body of the
vehicle. The net resul_ of all of these generators could be the accumulation
of large potentials, perhaps as high as 30,000 volts on the vehicle.
Often test vehicles used in space research are large and subject
to some of the same conditions outlined for the trailer in the paragraph
above. Stages of some of these vehicles are large enough to be of significant
capacitance to store appreciable energy if the potential is allowed to
build up on them.
The environment for electroexplosive devices is hostile in some
respects considering the static electric effects. The possibility of
generating and storing large quantities of electrical energy is ever
present unless proper precautions are taken.
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3.3.3 Radio Frequencies
Radio Frequency energy includes, when spoken of with respect to
EED safety, from what is normally considered audio frequencies through
microwave frequencies and even of higher frequency than microwave. It
is rather difficult to define the RF environment that m_y exist at a
particular point because of the mobility of existing high-power equipment.
It is equally difficult to generalize on the environment that a package
of EEDs or an EED being handled may experience without an exact knowledge
of the path of that particular EED with respect to some specific transmitter.
Levels of power density are often taken as the human tolerance
limit for electromagnetic energy. This value is often taken as i0 milli-
watts per square centimeter or i00 watts per square meter (they are the
same magnitude of field). One of the standard requirements at the Eastern
Test Range is that the vehicles being tested demonstrate ability to with-
stand exposure to i00 watts per square meter of ambient electromagnetic
energy for frequencies of 50 MHz or greater and 2 watts per square meter
for frequencies from 150 KHz to 50 MHz .
It is possible to obtain the specific frequencies and power densities
that exist in a specific area of interest through the Electromagnetic
Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC). The services available from this
center are described in a report by that Center (24).
Probably one of the most hazardous areas that could be encountered
would be right on the base or launch site where EED hardware is received.
Here all of the instrumentation, radar and communication equipment that
is needed for space exploration is concentrated. It would be well to use
the requirements set down for range safety. It is not likely that power
densities in excess of these will be encountered elsewhere without fore-
knowledge that the energy exists.
* AFETRM 127-i, Range Safety Manual, Headquarters Air Force Eastern Test
Range, i Nov. 1966.
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Another example of high concentration of RF emitters and potentially
hazardous explosives and fuels is an aircraft carrier during military
operations. It is mandatory here that the hazardous components be able to
survive the environment for it is not feasible to curtail RF transmission
during many combat operations.
3.4 Mechanical
The magnitude of the mechanical shock to which a package is subjected
is more severe in handling than it is in shipping. These results are
pointed out in a study by the National Safe Transit Committees (25). The
magnitudes of the shocks rec@ived in various stages of shipping by different
carriers is summarized below. The magnitudes of the shocks received
has been interpreted from graphs in the referenced publication.
Carrier
Air
Truck
Table 5
MAXIMUM VALUES OF SHOCK RECEIVED IN SHIPMENTS BY VARIOUS CARRIERS
Shock Magnitude (G's)
Enroute Handling
4 lO
5 US or State Highway at 30 to
50 MPH
lO Rough Street lO MPH 9
Rail Freight
or Express 6 Normal Travel
9 Switching and Car Shifting 9
Thus the normal range of shock that can be expected in a normal
shipment is on the order of i0 G maximum. The frequencies that are involved
in railroad travel are on the order of 2.5 to 5 CPS.
There is little that can be said about the abnormal conditions
that might be met such as that of an accident in any of the vehicles.
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It must be assumed that the loads would be of very great magnitude, but es-
timates of these loads are difficult to make or find in the literature.
Instances of dropping explosives, either packaged or unpackaged,
is considered abnormal. Shocks involved in these occurances are therefore
not treated in this section; however the results of drop testing of packages
containing typical dunnage material is included in Section 4.4.
3.5 Summary of Section
(i) The maximum temperature to which a package is normally
exposed is in the vicinity of 130°F. A maximum temperature
requirement of 160°F is believed to be adequate.
(2) The methods of computing electric fields, magnetic fields
and ground gradients resulting from lightning discharges
have been presented.
(3) While 500 picofarads and 5000_ohms is considered as a
reasonable estimate of the static circuit for the human
being, little has been established concerning vehicles
and their effects. Larger potentials than the nominal
20,000 volts for the human are believed possible.
(4) Radio frequency hazards are discussed w_th the result
that potentially hazardous conditions exist.
(5) Maximum acceleration applied in normal _h_pme_t By
air, highway or rail is I0 g_
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4. RESPONSE OF ELECTRIC INITIATORS
4.1 General
In Sections 2 and 3 we have discussed the sensitlvity and the
environment of electric initiators in the process of shipping and handling.
The magnitudes of these alone do not normally constitute a hazard unless
the energy available from the surroundings is delivered in such a manner
that the device can be activated (fired) or otherwise affected. Often
there is a very small margin of difference between the level at which
firing occurs and the level at which an EED can be adversely affected by
energy input.
We will attempt to define the conditions prevailing today in
shipping and handling by considering transfer mechanisms of the environment
to the EED. In most instances, while numerical values may be attached to
the phenomena, the results are best estimates and should be treated as
such. Conscious efforts will be made to keep the results on the safe
side. In this section, Section 5, and in Appendix C results of the study
will be brought together.
4.2 Heat
From examination of the heat sensitivity of EEDs and of their
constituents and from examination of the temperatures that exist in storage
bunkers and in some modes of transportation, it appears that there is
little need to be concerned with problems of heat causing explosive reactions
or adversely affecting electric initiators. The storage of explosives,
in general, in temperatures that are moderate is a good plan; but there
appears to be little real need to be concerned over temperature in normal
o *
shipping and handling if all devices are qualified to 160 F .
* MIL-STD 322, Basic Evaluation Test for use in Development of Electrically
Initiated Explosive Components for Use in Fuzes, 15 OQt. 1962, Sec. 5.2.9,p.6.
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Existing packages for blasting caps are required to have dunnage
similar to sawdust that will probably be an insulator equivalent to or
or better than sawdust. This type of dunnage will tend to round off any
very high short-duration temperatures to which the package could be sub-
jected, but there appears to be no pressing need, even for this minimal
form of protection, in light of the existing information on sensitivity
and environment.
Devices may exist that are not "characteristic", or conditions may
occur that are out of the ordinary. It is for this reason that suggestions
are made concerning temperature monitoring of the package and for thermal
testing of devices that are built for NASA use. These practices outlined
in Section 5 and Appendix C are calculated to minimize losses and
malfunctions due to exceptional conditions.
Fires in the vicinity of a package containing EEDs are an exception
to the discussion above. Most existing methods of packaging provide no
protection for the devices in as far as reliability is concerned. Most of
the boxes and dunnage materials recommended w-ill themselves burn. It is
understood that the Bureau of Explosives tests packages in a "bonfire test"
that proves the worth of a package to contain an explosion thus generated
or to minimize its effects.
4.3 Electrical
Electrical hazards are one of the most undetectable and unpredictable
type that the person concerned with packaging and handling EEDs can face.
Heat and mechanical excitations can be either seen or sensed by feel or
hearing, but the electrical hazards can not normally be detected by the
senses. This factor is one which makes them most feared and least understood.
We shall consider only briefly here the means by which electrical energy
can become a hazard and provide a number of references for further information
and study. This region has been and is currently being investigated ex-
tensively by Government agencies and their contractors.
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4.3.1 Responses to the Lightning Stimulus
Lightning becomes a hazard to electroexplosive devices in at least
five distinct ways. Each of these have to do with nature of the lightning
process that was discussed in some detail in Section 3.
(i) The static field that exists under a cloud center
(2) The dynamic electric field that occurs during the
leader and main stroke portions of the discharge
(3) The dynamic magnetic field that emanates from the
return stroke
(4) The electric field that is set up in the earth as
a result of the main stroke current
(5) Direct conduction of the current from the main stroke
The static field is perhaps the minimum hazard of the five mentioned
because there is little energy brought to bear on devices that are on the
surface of the earth. Even relatively poor grounds prevent the accumulation
of charge. Objects that are well insulated from ground can acquire potentials
that depend upon their size, conductivity, leakage resistance to earth, and
shape among other less-important variables. The smaller an object, the
smaller its capacitance and hence the shorter the time required to build
to a given potential. If a small object is in the vicinity of a large object
and both have approximately the same other characteristics, the smaller
object will acquire a higher potential than the larger one at the same time.
The result is that there is a potential difference between the two objects.
If these objects are close enough together, a potential difference could
build between them to the point that a spark discharge could occur. The
spark will result in redistribution of the charges and current flow in
the objects.
The forementloned charges that accumulate on ungrounded objects
redistribute quickly when the leader and main stroke lightning discharges
occur. The result of the rapid change in the field surrounding objects
is often accompanied by sparking. Fires have been started in wooden barns
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as a result of sparking between nails holding surface boards on the
barn (26) •
Since sparking has been shown to be produced between close, small
metallic objects at distances of one half mile, there is need to
consider the effects of this field on electroexplosive devices, even those
that are inside of conventional packages. The main concern here is for
sparking that could occur between the leads and case of the device as a
result of the electric field.
The magnetic field resulting from the main or return stroke is
one of the most serious threats to most EEDs because of the intensity and
rapid change that this field undergoes. An approximate analysis of the
results of this field is contained in Appendix A. While some of the
assumptions made in this analysis are inexact, it has been shown by
others that this causes little error. This is supported by Equation 3-3
that describes the magnetic field as a function of time and distance. The
importance of parameters introduced into the EED package are ppinted up
in Appendix A.
It is not possible to predict what will happen to the individual
EED withou_ sensitivity information corresponding to the exposure time of
interest and this time extends from one microsecond through 500 microseconds
for lightning discharges. Either constant current or constant voltage
sensitivity of the EED in this time range of interest is essential to
the evaluation of the hazard from dynamic magnetic fields that are the
result of the return stroke of a lightning discharge. There is virtually
no information o_ the senstitivlty of EEDs used by NASA in this time range.
Assuming the worst case condition, that of the most sensitive wire
bridge device that is known in this realm of time, the "no-fire" current
is on the order of 200 milliamperes. With a resistance of one ohm in the
entlre circult a finite probability of firing would begin to occur at
0.2 volts. This potential would exist at i00 meters from a strike in a
loop area of 0.01 square meters. Repeated strokes cause additional
concern and could stack thermally if the thermal tlme constant is long enough.
4O
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The ground gradient resulting from a lightning strike creates
potential drops across portions of the earth. If any part of the EED is
in direct contact with the earth, or if there is a small gap between the
EED and the earth, then there is a chance that a portion of the energy
from the ground currents will_be diverted through a vulnerable portion of
the EED. Potential differences of over 16 KV for each meter of earth can
be experienced depending upon the earths resistivity in the area of the
strike.
The ground gradient can exist at relatively large distances from
the strike point. This makes handling of EEDs during lightning storms
particulary hazardous and foolish. There is the distinct possibility
that large current surges can be generated during this time due both to
the field itself and due to the possibility of connecting the EED so that
it includes a portion of the earth in the circuit.
Packaged EEDs, in general are safer than those with extended leads
or connected to incompletely shielded circuits. Sharp endson the leads
or on the EED case would tend to make the devices more prone to acceptance
of a discharge from the potential of the earth gradient. In this instance
as well as in a number of others, it would be desirable to use a foil
enclosure for the packaged EED.
A direct strike of lightning on a package of initiators would
result in currents and voltages in the devices that would be difficult
to define. It is nearly certain that at least some of them would be
fired. Experiments to provide _etter knowledge in this area are now
possible using natural lightning it would seem by triggering lightning
from storm clouds by means of rockets trailing wires. This has been done
by the Lightnlng and Transient Research Institute.
Direct strikes on conventional aircraft in flight have resulted in
damage ranging from very light to extensive, depending upon the location
hit among other factors. Usually troubles occur in the metal skins, in the
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metal-plastlc or pure plastic structures, or across poor bonds. In short,
the trouble occurs whenever the target material has a reasonably large
resistance. Natural lightning strikes have caused holes up to 4 inches
in diameter on aircraft skins.
It would seem that even with a direct lightning strike, explosives
with a thick low-reslstance casing would he reasonably safe insofar as the
initiator itself is concerned. If thln-walled charge containers are used,
such as is used on some of the lead and plastic enclosed linear charges,
intermediate explosive such as PETN and RDX could probably be detonated.
The effects of lightning discharges on the internal portions of
simulated rockets and spacecraft structures has been under study in the
Lightning and Transients Research Institute (27) . The work of this group
included experiments on a cylindrical vessel of aluminum with a wall
thickness of 90 mils. This vessel was subject to energy from the discharge
of a generator capable of delivering current s_rges up to about i00,000
amperes. Surges were delivered either through a sending probe that
consisted of a straight grounded conductor parallel to the cylindrical
axis of the vessel or by a direct discharge through the cylinder from
the top surface. Fields inside of the cylindrical vessel were checked
with a loop I0 cm in diameter connected to a Tektronix 321 oscilloscope.
An analysis indicates that fields inside the cylinder are the
result of either a conductive voltage drop on the inside of the wall or
a combination of the mutual inductance between the wall and some center
conductor, and the self-lnductance of the wall. If the wall and the conductor
are coaxial, the voltage appearing between the bottom of the center conductor
and the wall is given by (L-M)(dl/dt) + IR.
where
L = inductance of the shield in henrys
M = mutual inductance between inner conductor and
shields in henrys
i = current flowing through the shield in amperes
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R = resistance in the shield in ohms
t = time in seconds
In this ideal case L = M because of perfect mutual coupling between the
cylinder and the conductor. It was demonstrated that in the practical
case there are discontinuities in the wall due to joints, holes and access
ports that cause L and M to be equal.
Practical experiments were run to show that there were indeed
fields within the cylinder. With a top cover bolted onto the cylinder
and with a butt Joint between the two halves of the cylinder, a number
of measurements were made with the instrumentation described earlier.
Passing a current of 70,000 amperes through sending probe or through the
cylinder itself resulted in the delivery of a voltage pulse inside the
cylinder that showed ringing, decaying exponentially with time. Maximum
voltages of I00 millivolts appeared on the loop, at the point where the
cover was joined to the wall of the cylinder. This was true whether the
current was applied through the sending probe or through the wall of the
cylinder. The amplitude of this signal could be reduced by improving
the contact of the joint between the cylinder wall and the cover. Tighter
bolting resulted in a substantial reduction of the signal and "Heli-arc"
welding of the top reduced the signal by an order of magnitude. Near the
bottom of the welded tank, the loop signals were on the order of 260
milllvolts. The bottom of the tank was open in this case. Increasing
the distance between the sending probe and the tank resulted in a drop
in induced voltage, according to a distance function somewhere between
linear and square law.
Penetration of energy near a 2-inch diameter hole in the wall of
the cylinder resulted in a maximum induced voltage of about i00 millivolts.
All of these investigations on the penetration of energy through the
wall are interesting but they do not demonstrate whether explosive devices
are safe within the confines of metal cases subjected to direct discharge.
With the loop size used and with the instruments described, and because
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the loop itself probably has a very low impedance, the potentials indicated
are probably the open-clrcult potentials of the loop. The power delivered
to a one-ohm load resistor would be no greater than about 90 milliwatts,
and would be a few milliseconds in duration at the most. Under these
conditions there is little need to be concerned for the safety of most
electroexplosive devices or for other cased charges. However, larger
pick-up loops or larger openings in the wall could prove hazardous. There
was sparking observed on the inside wall of the cylinder near joints in
the surface. This could well present a problem if the lead wires of EEDs
were to contact the inside wall of the cylinder.
4.3.2 Response to Static Discharges
Static discharges most probably account for the largest percentage
of accidental initiations of EEDs. The accounts of accidental initiations
date back to at least 1954. (28) Most of the reports of accidents at this
time were with the use of carbon bridge detonators that are generally more
sensitive in the bridge mode than are wire bridge devices in the pins-to-
case mode.
Devices have been fired with potentials of less than i000 volts
from 500 plcofarad capacitors. Indications are that many areas concerning
the static sensitivity of bulk explosive materials as well as electric
initiators are still in need of research and development. We are uncertain
of the complete mechanism involved in the detonation or initiation of EEDs
by static.
The electrostatic hazard comes about whenever there is a charging
source, a location for storage of the charge that is generated, and a
means of switching the stored charge into the EED. Energy levels in
the hundreds of ergs must be considered_potentially hazardous to EEDs
even though some of them will withstand much more. It is difficult to
predict the efficiency with which energy can be delivered from a charged
source to the explosive. If we consider perfect transfer efficiency, then
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the body with a capacitance of 500 picofarads needs only be charged to
a potential of 200 volts to deliver an energy of i00 ergs.
Charging sources have generally been found to involve some highly
insulating material, usually in thin films. Generally these materials
have been of plastic or other synthetic materialo It is possible to remove
charge directly from such materials by approaching them with sharp objects
such as the shorted leads of twin-lead _nltiators. _
Normally most plastic materials have a surface resistivity as high
1020as ohms per square (29) Furthermore, plastics by their nature, tend
to flow and make good surface contact with other materials that exhibit
a contact difference of potential. Harder materials such as metals, concrete,
wood and plaster create large surface contact areas when pressed against
plastic materials. For these reasons plastics are noted to be static
producing. Two properties of the plastics that contribute to the charge
accumulation are (i) their participation in the formation of the charge
by having good rubbing contact and relatively high contact difference
of potential with other materials (2) their retention of a charge for
extended periods of time.
Insulating materials like plastics may contain a number of charge
domains on a single surface. These domains may have either polarity and
for this reason it is possible to obtain a discharge across the surface
of the material as it is moved. Many of us have observed spark discharges
of this type when removing clothing of synthetic material in a darkened room.
The measure of the time that a charge can be retained on the surface
of a plastic material is used to determine the surface resistivity of plastic
materials. Research in this direction was prompted by the accumulation of
unsightly films on clear plastics from atmospheric contamination. Reduction
of the surface resistivity from the nominal 1020 ohms per square has been
found to reduce decay times from several months to several minutes. Reduction
of surface resistance has been accomplished by the addition of antistatic
elements to the plastic in the formulation stage, just prior to the molding;
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and treatments of the formed plastic materials have been used with success
in an effort to reduce surface resistance. Some of these treatments are
water soluble and subject to deterioration with time and use. On the
other hand, some are claimed to be reasonably uneffected by exposure to
moisture and wear.
Plastics may be made conductive by t_i_addition0f conductive
fillers such as graphite or silver to t_mate_rial in th_ liquid or
nearly liquid stage (25) . These fillers often change some of th_ ph_cal
properties of the plastic to the extent that they are of restrZcted use.
The conductivity of the composite materials is usually higk [low resistance).
Some of these have resistivities of 5 ohm-cmwith carhon fillers and as
low as 10 -4 ohm-cm with a silver filler. The use of conductive fillers
results in drastic changes in the material properties.
Antistatic plastics are made with an agent that renders them
conductive to a limited extent (resistivities of 105 to 1012 ohm-cm). The
electrochemical changes introduced cause minimal changes inother physical
characteristics.
Assessment of surface resistance is made by applying two con-
ductive strips of silver paint to the surface of the plastic. The antista-
tic coating is applied to the surface left between the two conductive paint
strips. The strips will have a capacity that can be measured or calculated.
A potential is placed between the two strips and the potential source is
removed. The time for this potential to decay to 37% of the initial value
is measured. At this point the time is equal to the product of the resis-
tance and the capacitance. The resistance can then be computed and the
resistance of the surface expressed in ohms per square by knowing the sur-
face area between the two conductive strips.
Ratings of surface resistance have been stated in terms of the
desired results for the plastic industry and for what can be obtained with
commercial antistatic compounds. A "poor" rating represents a resistance
1016of over ohms per square and a "good" rating less than I0 I0 ohms per
square (30). There are some reservations about the desirable levels of
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resistivity for use in the packaging of electroexplosive devices and
further consideration is warranted.
Some experiments with conductive plastic materials were made;
these are reported in Appendix D.
4.3.3 Response to Radio Frequencies
RF hazards are more difficult to analyze than most others because
of the many complex variables that affect the way that energy is extracted
from the RF field and transferred to the EED. Considerable background is
needed in electromagnetic field theory and antennas to analyze a potentially
hazardous circuit or to recognize that one is present.
Because of the nature of antennas and associated circuits, they
are sensitive to frequency and subject to resonances, not only in the
antenna element, but also in the leads connecting the antenna to the EED.
In a general analysis, where the conditions of the transmitting source
are not known, the circuit is usually treated as though it were at resonance,
perfectly matched, and not subject to losses. This type of analysis is
known as "worst case". It is a conservative approach to systems analysis.
General methods of analysis using this approach are available from a number
of sources (31'32) and the methods used will only be su=_arlzed here.
Generally a parameter known as aperture is used in expressing the
ability of an antenna system to extract electromagnetic energy from a
field. The aperture (A) in square meters is defined as the ratio of the
power (W) in watts delivered to the load to the ambient power density (P)
in watts per square meter (33). When conditions are optimized, as we stated
earlier, then the aperture is known as maximum effective or A . Effective
em
aperture or Ae requires eqal and opposite reactances in a circuit
but allows for differences in the real portion of the antenna and load
impedances.
Specific conditions for packaged EEDs are generally restrictive.
Limitations are generally imposed because of economic considerations of
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package size. Normmlly EEDs are either of the twin lead or connector
type. Twin lead EEDs may have leads up to 15 feet or even longer, but
leads this long are usually folded or rolled to a smaller dimension so
that they can be packaged and shipped economically. Net or effective
lead length in the package is seldom more than about 15 to 23 cm.
In a previous study (34) it was shown that the maximum directivity
D of three antennas; the unterminated rhombic, the long wire and the
m
circular loop; can be expressed as
D = 1.3 L except for L less than 2 when D _ 1.5
m
where L is the overall lead length in wavelengths
The maximum effective aperture Aem of any lossless antenna is
D% 2
A
em 4_
where
D is the directivity and
is the wavelength
The directivity equation indicates that as the frequency decreases,
the maximum directivity drops to 1.5 for a fixed length such as we have
assumed.
The equation for maximum effective aperture indicates that the
aperture increases as the square of the wavelength. This is not true for
the effective aperture where a specific value of directivity and length
can be stated. Where there is a fixed length, the maximum aperture will
occur at frequencies with wavelengths comparable to that length or at
frequencies higher than the one of first resonance. For these Higher reson-
ances, the directivity increases but the wavelength decreases.
The maximum aperture in this instance will be approximately 0.i
square meters. Resonances may occur at frequencies greater than the first
resonance in which case the directivity would be greater and the wavelength
would be smaller.
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Indications are that the most hazardous frequency for packaged
EEDs will be around a maximum wavelength of 23 cm. This depends upon
a number of factors, but primarily upon the length of the antenna in
question. The frequency to be most concerned with then is on the order
of 1300 MHz or higher while the device is in the package. When the
device is unpackaged and being handled, then the situation changes and
the analysis must become more general (15).
Protection in the form of shielding for packaged devices will be
adequate for microwave frequencies if it is adequate for the lightning
condition mentioned in Section 4 and in Appendix A.
Connector type EEDs have been shown to be most vulnerable when
the direction of propagation is along the axis of the connector (32). Power
delivered to the EED in this case is no more than that of an equivalent
opening in an infinitely large conducting plate.
Generally the maximum aperture is no greater than i.i times the area
of the entrance port of the connector as long as the perimeter of the
opening is greater than three wavelengths. When the hole dimensions are
about the same as the wavelength, then the aperture could approach 1.7
times the hole area. Normally the dimensions of the connector are on the
order of 1 cm or less and the aperture is on the order of .00013 square
meters. Fields on the order of i00 watts per square meter would therefore
deliver no more than about 13 milliwatts to the device; no problem.
For small loops, such as those often encountered in EEDs that have
been shorted for shipment, the effective aperture is given by: (33)
46700 A 2
A =
e 12
where
= the terminating or bridge wire resistance -ohms
A = the loop area - square meters
= the wavelength - meters
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Conditions that apply to the validity of this equation are that
the radiation resistance is zero, the loop dimensions are very smmll with
respect to the wavelength, a conjugate match of the reactances of antenna
and load exists, and that alignment of the loop with respect to the field
is for maximum power to the load.
Under typical package conditions, the area of a loop could be on
the order of 20 square centimeters (.002 square meters), and the maximum
wavelength under which the loop equation should apply would be on the
order of 0.5 meters (based on a wavelength I0 times one side of a square
with an area of 0.002 square meters). The effective aperture under these
conditions, assuming a bridge resistance of i ohm, would be about 0.25
square meters. The power delivered to an EED under these conditions would
be 25 watts with an ambient power density of I00 watts per square meter.
Most of the currently used EEDs fire with power levels that are
below i watt and indications are that help is needed here. Thankfully,
as was indicated in Section 3, the areas that lead to this kind of power
densities are few, and conditions leading to maximum aperture are seldom
met at the same time. In several instances, however the experimentally
determined aperture and the effective aperture have been in agreement
within one order of magnitude or even closer (35) .
Help is required in this area if we are not willing to take the
risk of some unexpected initiations of devices inshipping and handling.
Protection of the EED is required in the form of built in attenuation or
in the form of shielding for shipment followed by inspection of radiation
hazards that may exist in certain areas where power densities are high.
Scheduling of "on" times for radiating equipment may be necessary where
there proves to be a hazard or where one is expected.
4.4 Mechanical Response
It is most probable that the mechanical response of electric initiators
varies widely from device to device. It was mentioned earlier that little
known about the specific response characteristics of specific devices.
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Recently an explosive bolt was detonated by vibration levels on
the order of 15g at 300 to 900 cps . While the magnitudes of vibration
normally encountered in transportation are not this great, the differences
in magnitude are too small to ignore them completely. There is need to
be concerned with the safety and reliability of devices that show sensitivity
this close to ambient conditions.
There is some concern over the magnitude of shock that is imparted
to EEDs in the process of shipping and handling. There are also the effects
of vibration during shipping that we feel are extremely small in all of the
cases known to us. Most of the vibrations that are encountered on trans-
porting vehicles are in the near insignificant range of magnitude compared
to some of the flight qualifications that are imposed by NASA. Vibrations
and shocks in railway, aircraft and motor vehicle transportation are
normally less than 10g and of reasonably low frequency.
Dropping of a package onto a hard surface could mean higher accel-
eration and greater shocks. In order to learn the approximate magnitude
of the acceleration that an EED could receive upon dropping a package,
we did the following. Instead of placing an EED in the package we placed
a Columbia Model 508 accelerometer in the dunnage material. Two packages
were tried. One was a metal can about i0 inches in diameter and about
12 inches deep, and the other was a wooden box about 8 by 12 by 20 inches.
We had received EEDs in each of these packages earlier. The dunnage used
for this test was brown paper-like material, packed to just fill the portion
of the container not occupied by the accelerometer.
The output leads of the accelerometer were connected directly to
the probe (i0 to i) of a Tektronix 535 oscilloscope. A number of drops
were made with each of the two containers while changing the drop height.
A recording was made of the acceleration as a function of time by photo-
graphing the oscilloscopetrace. Records were later examined for peak
acceleration. Results are plotted in Figure ii.
*This work was carried out in the Pyrotechnic Research Facility, AMPD at
NASA Langley Research Center, March 1967.
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It can be seen that there is an ever increasing slope on both
of these curves and that the wooden container appears to impart about
30% less acceleration to the simulated EED than the_metal package. It
is always dangerous to extrapolate information but if we were to do so
here, packages dropped from a height of 40 feet or more would still be
within a safe range according the criteria that acceleration not exceed
10,000g.
In design of a package to preclude damage, consideration is given
to the individual needs of the system. The acceleration that is imparted
to the packaged mass under the most severe conditions expected is reduced
by the selection of dunnage material that will deform below the damage
level of the packaged product. The procedures for this method of analysis
are available in a number of sources in the literature (1). Unfortunately,
complete data for design of EED packaging are not available.
One of the more serious problems that could conceivably be encountered
by a package is that of explosive propagation. That is, if one device is
activated unintentionally, the others may fire also and in the worst case
might all fire at once. Information is very meager on what can be expected
to happenunder any given set of circumstances without actually trying the
condition in question.
The various types of output of electroexplosive devices compound
this problem. The needs connected with damage and other protection to
prevent propagation appear to narrow themselves slightly according to the
following types of output.
i. A hlgh-order detonation with accompanying shock
wave, heat and high velocity case fragments.
2. A "soft" or mild explosion such as that from a
squib with lower velocity fragments, hot burning
explosive and moderate but long-lastlng pressure.
3. Intense, long-lasting heat from charges identified
as coruscating.
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In the first class would be devices such as blasting caps,
detonators and explosive bolts. In the second group would be primers,
squibs and activation cartridges. The third class would contain such
devices as jet charges, igniters and flares. The same kind of package
may not be the optimum one for all of these three classes of output.
Concerned at the moment with the first class of devices, we
evaluated the effects of different dunnage material on propagation by
setting off a DuPont E99 blasting cap at the center of an array of
T24EI detonators arranged around the periphery and at various distances
from the cap using the layout illustrated in Figure 12A. The E99 blasting
cap contains 1 gram or more of high explosive material and the T24EI de-
tonator contains 70 mg of PETN, 60 mg of dextrinated lead azide and 5 mg
of milled lead styphnate.
For each test T24EI detonators were spaced at one-inch intervals
from the center of the array but in such a way that one device would
have minimum interference with effects of the blast. The results are
illustrated in Table 6.
Table 6
!
I
I
t,
I
!
EXPLOSIVE PROPAGATION TESTS IN DUNNAGE MATERIALS
Distance from Center (in.) 1 2 3 4 5
Packing Material
Crepe Paper x x x o o
Vermiculite* o o o o o
Tightly Wound Newspaper x x x x o
Foam Rubber (white) x o o o o
Rubberized Hair o o o o o
Styrofoam block x x x
x - indicates fire
0 - indicates no fire
* Two samples at each position
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More detailed tests were made than can be simply presented. On
the foam rubber, detonators were spaced each 1/4 inch up to 1-3/4 inches one
was placed at 1.4 inches. The one at 1.4 inches fired and the remaining
six inside this location did not fire. The three beyond this location
did not fire. This left us with a slight puzzle that was soon solved.
The pattern of the output of the blasting cap is apparently doughnut
shaped about the center of the longitudial axis, as is shown in Fig. 12B.
A repeat of the experiment with better alignment of the cap and the detonator
gave the results shown in Table 6. Additional detonators were fixed at
1/4, 1/2, 3/4, three at i and one at 1.5 inches, all of which fired. Three
at 2, one at 3, and one at 4 inches failed to fire.
A sample 2" x 4" of foamed aluminum was received by courtesy of the
Foamalum Corporation. This material is relatively new and considered to
be highly absorbing for impact applications. An experiment was made with
this material by drilling holes in it as shown in Figure 13. An E99
blasting cap was placed in the center hole as shown in the figure. T24EI
detonators were placed in the three holes to the right and $94 squibs in
the three holes to the left. The distances to each of the devices from
the blasting cap were 1/2, i and 1-1/2 inches. Both the T24EI and
the $94 located at 1/2 inch from the cap fired. While both of the devices
at 1-inch were dented, neither of them fired. Neither of the devices at
1-1/2 inches fired, nor were they visably affected. Considering the pos-
sibility of using more solid material between sections of a package, we
tested some polycarbonate plastic materials that were available. These
materials are now in use for such applications as street-light covers in areas
where stones are apt to be thrown at the street lights. These materials
are tough and appear to fail in much the same manner as a metal.
Figures 14 through 17 illustrate the effects of setting off a
T24EI detonator inside various configurations of this type of plastic
identified in Table 7 below.
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Fig .  14 - Effects of T24E1 Detonator on Polycarbonate Plast ics:  Various Configurations 
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~ 
F i g .  15 - Effects of T24E1 Detonator on Polycarbonate Plastics:  Various Configurations 
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Fig. 16 - Effects of  T24E1 Detonator on Polycarbonate Plast ics:  
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Vari ous Configurations 
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Table 7
DESCRIPTION OF POLYCARBONATE MATERIALS
TESTED FOR FRAGMENT AND BLAST PROTECTION
Figure Number Description
14 Injection Molded Merlon
**
15 Blow Molded Lexan
16 Injection Molded Lexon
17 Extruded Lexan
While each of these materials appear to be severely damaged, the
type of failure in each case indicates that the materi_l is a potential
absorber.
While it appears that explosive devices may be packed at relatively
high densities as the results of some of the propagation tests indicate,
caution is urged in the use of these data due to the relatively small
quantities that were tested. The number of dunnage materials tested was
also very small. There is certainly inadequate information here for re-
liable use of these materials even under the stated conditions. There is
a general need for this type of information, and perhaps a more basic ap-
proach to obtaining it could be investigated. For example, a number of
different types of explosive materials could be preseed into cylindrical
bodies and exposed to similar testing procedures. Repeated tests of this
nature could establish minimum distances in different, selected dunnage
materials. Knowledge of the properties of materials under shock loading
would be helpful in selecting the most promising materials to test.
*Merlon is a trade name of the Union Carbide Co.
**Lexan is a trade name of the General Electric Co.
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4.5 Summary of Section
(i) Heat is no problem if EEDs qualified to 160°F. Normal
dunnage will provide some thermal protection even in
higher temperatures if exposure time is short.
(2) Spark discharges from static field around lightning storms
is a potential hazard. Sparking between small metal objects
during dynamics of lightning discharge is a serious problem.
(3) The magnetic field that accompanies the main stroke can couple
loops in EED leads with enough energy to fire them. More
sensitivity information is needed on EEDs in 10 to 100 micro-
second time range to assess the problems. Ground gradients
are a hazard in handling - not so much with packaged EEDs.
(4) Direct Strikes are a real hazard to EEDs, packaged or
unpackaged. Cylindrical metal containers afford some
protection in event of direct strike.
(5) Static discharges are a frequent cause of accidents. The
human body needs only 200 volts to be in the troublesome
range and has been known to accumulate 20,000 volts. Use
of non-conductive plastics in packaging is unsafe. Additives
and fillers reduce the resistivity of plastic films. Methods
of assessing these materials are discussed.
(6) Radio frequencies are an&lysed by a worst-case approach that
makes use of circuit conditions optimized for power to the
EED. Aperture methods of analysis are reviewed briefly.
RF is a problem in packaging and shipping mainly for
frequencies in the L Band or higher. "Connector" type EEDs
are relatively safe from RF. Worst Case Analysis of a
hypothetical loop results in an aperture of 0.25 square
meters but this is worst case. There are handling problems
because of large worst case apertures that are a real hazard
in some fnstances. Help is needed here.
(7) Vibrations of 15 g at 300 to 900 Hz have resulted in EED
firings. Experiments wfth normal dunnage during drop in-
dicate little if any problem with g loads up to 100 at drop
heights of 30 inches. Tests on propagation of blast from
one EED to others in the same package show Vermiculite to
provide good protection. Polycarbonates and foam a aluminum
are potentially good blast absorbers.
63
_TTHE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARC_I LABORATOR/F..S
F-C1853
5. DISCUSSION OF PACKAGING PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
5.1 Heat
For packaging and handling, there is little need to be concerned
with heat problems, at least in the shipping cycleand storage cycle.
Normal conditions would have little effect on the electric initiator.
Combined heating and any of the other factors considered in this report
could present other problems of which we are not currently aware, but
existing transportation temperatures and storage temperatures are well
below the level that could be considered either hazardous or conductive
to reliability problems if units are qualified to 160°F.
5.-2 _ Electrical
Electrical environments still appear to be among the greatest hazards
that the EED must survive. The problems stems from lack of the ability to
detect electrical phenomena without instruments. Static is probably
the number one cause of electrical accidents with EEDs, followed closely
by lightning and RF. Simple shielding can reduce the frequency of acci-
dents and the probability of their occurrence.
Plastic materials that absorb water from the atmosphere appear
to have little advantage over conventionalplastic materials if only the
resistivity of the materials is considered. Even when the water-absorbing
plastics are compared with conventional plastics using them as the belt
of a Van de Graaff generator there appears to be less than one order of
magnitude difference in charge generation. Appendix D contains results
of studies on these materials. Hindsight dictates that neither of these
tests are really conclusive concerning the application of this family
of materials to EED packages. Simple qualitative experiments with the
water absorbers and cloth show that rubbing produces little if any charge
on the water absorbing plastic material compared to untreated plastic
films. More work is needed in this light, and experiments with EED cir-
cuits are recommended.
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A wrap of aluminum foil would greatly reduce the effects of electric
fields and reduce static and RF problems appreciably. Some of the problems
associated with radial fields in the earth surrounding a lightning
strike would also be reduced.
The low frequency radiation from the magnetic field surrounding
a lightning strike is more difficult to cope with. Methods to protect
EEDs from this field, however, generally provide protection from the other
electrical influences and will result in survival under almost any
circumstance barring a direct lightning strike. The need here is for a
complete enclosure and probably one made of iron that is copper plated
on the outside and inside. The copper plating will account for approxi-
mately 45 db of attenuation at i0 kc due to reflection, and the iron
will account for about 4 db /mil at this same frequency (36) . Excluding
the effects of leakage through the end caps or shields, attenuation in
the hundreds of db can be obtained using such a design with relatively
thin-walled vessels and the attenuation increases with increasing fre-
quency• Sensitivity data on EEDs in the region from iO to i00 microseconds
would be helpful in analysis of problems related to protection from
lightning.
This procedure is not an electrical cure-all. First these de-
vices must be packed in such a container and requirements of the ICC are that
such containers be provided with dunnage between the device and the metal
container. This dunnage must be reasonably static-free_ there is no
r
material that is completely static proof. The dunnage material needs
more examination, but at this point, it would appear that resistance
should be in the range of 104 ohms per square for surface resistivity or
10 3 ohm-cm for volume resistivity or lower. In other words it would be
well to have the material be a semiconductor rather than an insulator.
Once the initiator is inside the metal enclosure, then any
available means of further protection can be used. The static production
of the additional dunnage makes little difference as long as the device
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is in a metal enclosure. Only when the devices are being unpacked is
there a possible hazard and that one can be easily eliminated by the
choice of proper procedure. Proper procedure would include removal of
all of the metal enclosures from the dunnage. This would be followed by
placing all of the metal enclosures on a grounded bench top of highly
conductive material either of metal or other conductor. Operations should
be carried out with personnel_gr0unded. Th e handling area should b e
freed from RF fields either by shielding or by an adequate survey of the
area followed by shut-down of possibly-hazardous sources during handling.
Current shipping requirements set down by the ICC (5) show
little concern with electrical problems at this time; and this is under-
standable in light of the existing record: devices are not often fired
in an unexplained fashion while being shipped. Part of this is due
to low intensity environments. In the future, however, there may be
some difficulties as the RF environments are becoming more intense and
the use of EEDs increases. It is a matter of probabilities and these
are rapidly increasing in favor of more power being delivered to EEDs
even in the packaged state.
Delivery of the packaged EEDs to a NASA launch site almost in-
sures exposure to RF sources of a higher level than they have received
in the earlier part of the journey. However, extra precautions are usually
in force in such areas and unpacking and handling procedures are followed
similar to those outlined above.
To establish and insure what levels of RF, static and lightning
can be endured is a rather difficult problem; but this problem is being
attacked and solved in a number of ways by various installations with
success. An even broader solution to some of the problems of an electrical
nature is being taken in some instances. The following listing indicates
some of the current attacks being made:
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(i) A conscious effort is being applied to the development of
static insensitive EEDs.
(2) Increased firing current and power is being required of EEDs.
(3) RF attenuation is being built into some EEDs.
(4) Efforts are being made to use twisted shielded pairs in the
design of circuits.
(5) Worst-case analysis is being applied to circuits and the
sensitivity of EEDs is being determined under RF excitation.
These developments are contributing to a reduction in electrical
hazards. However there are not as yet any recognized standards which
may be applied to packaging.
This study has not resulted in recommendations for crash pro-
grams to improve the design of EED packaging; however, there is some
cause for concern. Some EEDs are getting through the network of testing
that may cause problems from RF and from static as well as from lightning.
These are the ones that could conceivably cause both safety hazards and
possibly reliability problems.
More electrical testing is recon_nended for electric initiators
that will tend to screen out devices that are ultra sensitive to
static and RF. The form of this testing requires more study than the
scope of this contract will permit. With this in mind, we have prepared
a llst of recommended packaging procedures that includes some pretesting
of the electrical properties of the EEDs (Appendlx C). This is intended ;
as a guide for packaging and not as a universal test program. However,
some of the recommendations may help in the general areas of safety and
reliability.
5.3 Mechanical
It appears that current EED packaging practices protect from
mechanical forces and heat with one major exception in as far as ICC
regulations are concerned. Many of the devices that do not have a dangerous
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output have no dunnage requirements. Unless the manufacturer of the EED
knows better, there is no requirement that the devices be well protected
from shock and vibration. However, it appears that the manufacturers and
possibly his customer have in most cases worked out mutually satisfactory
procedures.
There is clearly a large difference in the ability of dunnage
materials to prevent propagation from one device to another in a package.
Materials like vermiculite appear to have desirable isolation properties
from blast and fragments. This material is also fire resistant, which
makes an excellent combination of properties.
Polycarbonate plastics appear to offer high resistance to the
effects of explosive output. While these materials may have some
undesirable static electricity generating characteristics, other means
of protection that are discussed in this report would make them ideally
suited for barriers in EED package design. The use of these materials
should be investigated further provided suitable means of reducing their
electrical resistance can be found.
5.4 Indicators for Monitoring Shipments
One means of assuring that a package has not been subject to
extremes of environment in shipping, handling and storage is to include
in the package some form of peak level indicator. Relatively inexpensive
devices are now available that respond to humidity, temperature and
acceleration. Those that are available include devices that change color
due to humidity and temperature. The indicators for acceleration are a
little more complicated and expensive, but these are resettable and
may be used repeatedly. Most of the humidity indicators respond to the
ambient condition and do not really indicate what has happened during the
history of the system of which they are a part. Temperature indicators
change permanently. Once they are subject to a temperature in excess of
the value for which they are designed, there is a permanent change of
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color, usually from white to black. The temperature range of these papers
is from around i00 degrees F (37,8 C) to around 500 degrees F (260 C).
Response time is on the order of i second at the temperature indicated.
t
These devices are affected to some degree byhumidity and also by solvents.
greases, oil and water. Accuracy of temperature indication is on the
order of 1%.
Humidity indicators change color, under dry conditions the color
is usually blue and when moisture is present the color changes to pink.
Some of these indicators** are graded in that the color change may occur
in more than one area of the indicator. A device manufactured by the
company cited has three circles about 1/2 inch in diameter marked 30,
40 and 50 that change progressively as the humidity increases. These
are apparently made under a Mil-Std, for they are marked with MS20003-2.
Some devices for the sensing of acceleration operate by the
retention of a mass by a permanent magnet, t The mass is of a magnetic
material, so that it is attracted to the magnet. An accelerating force
applied to the mass tends to release the mass from the magnetic attraction.
If the accelerating force is large enough, the mass escapes the magnet's
restraint and the indicator is tripped. Some of these devices are very
directive and others operate over large angles of force. At times more
than one indicator is used to sense the acceleration that an object re-
ceives because of the directive characteristics of the sensor. Mass-
tt
spring systems also exist for this purpose.
* These data are for the products manufactured by the Paper Thermometer
Company, i0 Stagg Drive, Natick, Mass. 01762
** From examination of a Humidity Indicator made by the Humidial Co.,
Colton, California
t The Inertia Switch Corporation manufactures devices like the ones
described here.
tt Vexilar Engineering Inc., Box 738, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440
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While there are methods of determining the stimulus that an EED
receives from electrical environments, none of these have been reduced
to the point where they are acceptable universally. There is no simple
and inexpensive sensor that will indicate that a device has received a
certain ambient powe= density of RF radiation or a certain level of electric
field. There is an active interest in this area and it appears that the
development of an inexpensive sensor of this type would be welcomed.
Current practice is to simulate the EED using an instrumented device that
has about the same characteristics as the EED. Usually the bridgewire
heating is detected or the potential that appears at the bridgewire
(known as video detectors). It does not appear that this approach will
be of help as an indicator in a package. "One shot" indicators would be
of more value.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
(i) Existing recognized regulations lack the detail necessary to
design packages to guarantee safety and reliability in shipping
and handling in the following areas:
(a) Electrical protection form static generated charge
(b) Electrical protection from radio frequency energy
(c) Electrical protection from lightning discharges
(d) Mechanical protection from drop and impact
(2) Present shipping specifications offer reasonable safety of
personnel and adjacent equipment during shipment but do not
provide assurance of reliability at the destination.
(3) Industry practices have solved a majority of current shipping
problems without specification coverage. However it is to be
anticipated that environments of the future will tend to become
more severe than those to date particularly with regard to R.F.
(4) Standardized sensitivity or sensitivity groupings of EED's offer
one means of applying standard packaging practices.
(5) Experimental data developed during this program show:
(a) Vermiculite to be one of the best dunnage materials
to prevent propagation by blast and heat from detonat-
ing EEDs.
(b) Polycarbonate plastics to have failure mechanisms
similar to metals during application of a detonator
output.
(c) Water absorbing plastics to have resistivities differ-
ing only slightly from those of untreated plastics but
tending less to accumulate charges.
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(d) Accidental drop of normally packaged EEDs from a
height of 30 inches results in an acceleration of 90 g
or less to the EED.
(6) EEDs are safe from heat in normal shipping and storage condi-
tions if they can withstand exposure to 160°F.
(7) Data in the following areas are not considered adequate to draw
conclusions:
(a) Electrical sensitivity of EEDs to pulsed energy in the
time region of interest for lightning discharges (I to
500 microseconds) is inadequate to pin-point hazard
levels.
(b) Mechanical sensitivity of EEDs is not known accuratly
enough to preclude firing and loss of reliability
due to physical damage.
(c) Properties of dunnage materials necessary to predict
thickness requirements for flame, blast and shock
isolation are not defined except by individual experi-
ment or by judgment.
(d) Generalized static effects, other than those from
human circuits, are not well enough defined in terms
of the complete EED-circuit effect to predict results.
(8) The design of EEDs and the materials used in them vary so widely
that practical complete package design specifications are
difficult to formulate. Performance specifications on both the
package and the EED appear to be a reasonable possibility.
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6.2 Recommendations
It is recommended that:
(i) Performance specifications be generated for the packaging and
shipping of EEDs including the features of Appendix C.
(2) EEDs be completely wrapped in metal foil for shipping and
storage for protection from static electricity, electric fields
and high frequency RF until such time that more adequate pro-
tection is provided by specifications.
(3) Further work be undertaken to design and prove a type of con-
tainer for EEDs that will provide adequate electrical protection
from low-frequency RF and the magnetic fields from lightning
discharges as well as those of (2) above.
(4) A more detailed study of dunnage materials be undertaken in
order to obtain design information for specific classes of de-
vices including detonating devices, igniting devices and pressure
generating devices.
(5) Indicators for packages be given further study to apply them
in a quality assurance sense.
(6) Further examination of water absorbing plastic films be under-
taken with the objective of determining performance under operat-
ing conditions common to EED circuits.
These materials have potential applications where optically
clear or translucent materials are needed (filled conductive plastics are
opaque) or in clean rooms where some filled conductive plastics may cause
contamination.
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APPENDIX A
Approximation of Induced Potentials in Remote
Loops Due to Lightnin9 Discharges
In some respects the return stroke of a llghtning discharge is
much like a current through a wire. There are some differences in velocity
and in the size of the channel carrying the lightning current as well as
the length of the current channel as a function of time. Many points like
this one are still in the stages of doubt and investigation. If we assume
that the return stroke of a lightning discharge is like that of a current
carrying conductor of infinite extent, then we can express the magnetic
field surrounding the discharge as
B =--_ (A-l)
2_R
where B = is the flux density (webers/square meter)
= is the permeability of the medium (henries/meter)
I = is the current in the conductor (amperes)
R = is the radial distance from the stroke (meters)
Since the lightning stroke is a pulse of energy or current rather
than a continuous current, the magnetic field around the stroke will vary
with the current and at the same rate that the current varies.
It is known that when a closed conducting loop is exposed to
a fluctuating magnetic field, an EMF is induced in the loop that may be
expressed by*
-d IsB'ds
v = dt (A-2)
* John D. Kraus, Electromagnetics, McGraw Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1953.
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where B = is the flux density (webers/square meter)
s = is the elemental surface (square meters)
v = is the induced EMF (volts)
t = is the time (seconds)
At places where B is uniform over the surface being considered
this equation may be reduced to
dB
v = _ A sin e (A-3)
where A = is the area of the loop (square meters)
8 = is the angle between the plane of the loop
and the direction of the magnetic field (degrees)
The magnitude of the current that may exist in a lightning stroke
is argumentative and definitely variable over large limits. Some observers
claim that stroke currents in the return stroke could reach 150,000 amperes
and it is generally agreed that the average stroke current is on the order
of 30,000 amperes.
In safety considerations we must use the maximum current that is
conceivable for other than probabilistic computations. Thus from equation
(A-l) we can compute the magnitude of the flux density as a function of
the distance from the point of a lightning stroke.
In order to use equation (A-3) tO determine the magnitude of
the voltage that will be induced _n a loop of area A, we must know the
rate at which B changes with respect to time. A number of experimenters
have studied the problem of the wave shape of the pulse that lightning
will produce. The electric field in the vertical direction due to the
return stroke has been found to rise to a maximum value from zero in about
i0 microseconds and to return to zero in about the same time.* There are
secondary effects that persist for longer periods of time, but this pulse
appears to be the greatest part of the waveform.
* K.M.L. Srivastava and B.A.P. Tantry, VLF Characteristics of EMR from the
Return Stroke of Lightning Discharge, Indian J. of Pure Appl. Phys.
Vol. 4, July 1966.
A-2
"_THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
!
I
!
!
I
I
!
I
!
!
!
!
II
I
I
!
!
I
F-C1853
gives,
Equation (i), when solved with _ = 1.257 x I0-_ henry/met er
21 10 -7
B = (A-4)
R
With current rise and fall characteristics and the flux density
defined by Figure A-I the induced voltage in a loop will follow the shape
also shown in this figure. The maximum EMF in a loop will be given by
AB 2I 18-7
v - AT R A Cos 8 (A-5)
The induced EMF for various distances and loop areas has been
computed using this equation with a maximum current of 150,000 amperes.
These data are plotted in Figure A-2.
There are errors in this approximation that would be best brought
forward at this time. The assumption that the conductor is infinitely long
introduces an error because we know that the maximum length that can be
achieved is about twice the cloud height or on the order of I0,000 meters.
Thus at distances that are not short with respect to i0,000 meters there
will be an error that will result in an induced EMF of less than that
indicated in Figure A-2. Another source of error is in the assumption
that the current is continuous which also has a bearing on the length
of the column. The current proceeds from ground to the cloud at finite
velocity. At time zero, the velocity is zero and consequently the column
height is zero. The velocity of the charge column increases to near that
of light and then decreases. This phenomenon has the effect of a reduced
column height which is particularly effective in reducing the computed
induced voltage, particularly at great distance from the stroke. We feel
that the use of the information presented will provide safe limits in the
selection of shielding material and in the reduction of loop area to
reasonable limits on the part of the designer.
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APPENDIX B
Summary of Shipping Regulations for
Small Electroexplosive Devices
Shipping regulations for dangerous materials are governed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. These regulations for Highway, Rail
and Water transportation are put forth in T. C. Georges' Tariff No. 19.
This summary of regulations is intended only to serve as a guide and is
not to be construed as legally authoritative.
I. Blasting Caps, Electric
These devices in Class A, maximum hazard by definition; but
with one of two possible approaches, they may be identified as Class
C, minimum hazard.
].] Normal Procedure for Class C Identity of Electric Blastin9 Caps
i.i.i Ouantlty
a. Not more than 1000 devices
b. Not more than 50 grains (3.24 grams) explosive each
c. Not more than i00 caps per inside package.
i.i.2 Oatside Package
a. Must meet Specifications 14 and 15A of Tariff. Sections
78.165 and 78.168 of Tariff No. 19 give Construction
detail. Such as lumber nails, fasteners, joints and marking.
b. Must be clearly labeled with contents stated.
1.2 Electric Blasting Caps - Class C under Laboratory Sample Provision
Section 73.86 of Tariff No. 19
1.2.1 Quantity
a. Not more than i00 caps in one outside package.
B-I
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b. Not more than 1/2 lb. per inside package and not more
than 20 half pound samples per outside package.
1.2.2 Inside Package
a. Metal cans, glass bottles, rubber 8ontainers or plastic
that is not static generating. Strong waterproof paper
or cardboard.
1.2.3. Cushioning
a. Inside metal container must be surrounded with sawdust
or similar cushioning material and packed in another
wooden box prior to outside crating.
1.2.4. Outside Container
a. Essentially same as 1,-1-;2
2. 19niter, Safety Squibs, Delay Electric Igniters and
L]ectric Squibs - Class C - Section 73.]06
These devices are to be packed in strong fiberboard or wooden
boxes or metal barrels or drums properly described and properly marked
with the name on the outside package.
3. Cable Cutters, Power Cartrid@es, Release DevicesA
Jet Starter Cartridges
These devices to be packed in Spec 12H, 23F, or 23M fiberboard
boxes, gross weight not to exceed 65 Ibs. Also may be shipped in strong
wooden or metal boxes or otherwise containers approved by the Bureau of
Explosives. Starter Cartridges are to have leads short circuited when
shipped.
Must be marked with the name of the article and "HANDLE CAREFULLY -
KEEP FIRE AWAY."
B-2
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APPENDIX C
RECOMMENDEDPROCEDURES FOR DEFINING INITIATOR
SENSITIVITY, PROVIDING ADEQUATE PACKAGE PROTECTION,
ANg. ASSURING SAFE HANDLING ENVIRONMENTS
I. Specifications on the Initiator
Specifications should be established that are compatible with the
device being considered. Arbitrary sensitivity limits are a hindrance
to progress in serving the real purpose of EEDs and that is to do great
quantities of work with little initiating impetus.
I.I Electrical
a. Normal Sensitivity
The sensitivity of the device should be determined according to
the Bruceton Plan and regression equations should be determined
for the 5% and 95% probabilit±es of firing for times extending
from l0 microseconds through 5 minutes.
b. Sensitivity to Static Electricity
An adequate sample of the deMices should be tested with voltage
applied from pins-to-case and from bridgewire to bridgewire
The source should be a capacitor of 500 picofarads with
a resistance of 5000 ohms connected between the capacitor
and the device under test (in series). For safe human handling
of the device, it should withstand a potential of 25,000 volts
initially applied to the capacitor without firing or being de-
graded. Degradation shall be defined as a radical change in
sensitivity or in other electrical properties.
c. Radio Frequency Sensitivity
The RF power required to fire the device should be measured for
at least three frequencies; continuous wave tests should be made
at one frequency in the L hand, and pulsed tests should be made
C-1
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in the S and X bands. Probing techniques using a minimum
of EEDs are recommended for these tests. Results should
be obtained in the bridgewire, bridgewire to bridgewire
and pins-to-case modes.
d. Power Ground Fault or Lightning Fault
At least 500 volts should be applied between pins-to._ase and
where more than one bridg e element or electrode is involved,
also between this electrode and other electrodes not intended
for firing the device. The power source for this test should
be capable of delivering at least i00 milliamperes.
Results of these tests should be reported and contained in each
shipment of initiators from that particular lot in standard format with
which operating personnel of NASA are made familiar.
1.2 Mechanical
a. Each type of initiator shall be demonstrated to be safe and
operable after exposure to 50g of acceleration as produced
from a source of frequencies up to 30 cps and by drop tests
in a fixture that is determined to be adequate to provide
accelerations of 1000g.
b. All devices that are _o be used, packaged, transported or
handled should be inspected for integrity of the explosive
charge (presently a requirement of the ICC).
1.3 Heat
a. Each type of EED shall be tested so that the device is demonstrated
to be safe and operable after exposure to temperatures of 165°F
for a period of at least one month. Shorter times may be used
with higher temperatures if the method used is demonstrated to
be equivalent.
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2. Packaging Requirements
ICe regulations must be followed and in addition, the following
are reco_ended.
2.l Electrical
a. Each device now shipped or stored should be wrapped in a complete
enclosure of metal foil. This should be an interim measure
until such time that suitable enclosures can be designed to
provide attenuation at the lower frequencies and for the magnetic
fields produced by lightning and by low-frequency radio trans-
mission (see text).
b. Design criteria for the metal enclosure should be based on the
sensitivity information on the devices that are to be shipped.
It may be that one design will take care of all situations. The
basis for design should be the environment and sensitivity.
c. Electrical requirements for dunnage that is to be fitted between
the EED and the metal case should be that the material be conductive
to the extent that no static hazard exists. It appears that
the material should have a resistivity of 104 ohm-cm or less,
but more work is considered necessary on the dynamic characteristics
of anti-static plastics with conventional resistivities of.1012
ohms (Appendix D).
2.2 Mechanical
3.1
a. Adequate dunnage shall be applied to all packages to limit the
acceleration of the EED to 50g under the conditions of frequency
and drop impact acceleration contained in 1.2a.
3. Unpacking and Handling
Unpacking and Handling Environment
Assurance should be required that the area in which EEDs are to
C-3
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be unpacked and handled are free from electromagnetic energy that could
fire the device. This may be accomplished by survey of the electromagne-
tic radiation producers in the area and computing the ambient power density
or by measuring this density and providing adequate shielding if necessary.
Worst case analysis of possible antenna configurations should be made.
Comparison of the antenna apertures and the ambient power density will
determine either that the area is safe or that additional measures need
to be taken to assure safe operations from RF.
All personnel handling EEDs should be grounded, preferably by
wristlets. Floors, benches, table tops and other furniture in the area
should be grounded to a common ground and if possible to a grounding grid
system. Static producers should be rendered inactive by elimination of
them from the area or by other suitable means.
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APPENDIX D
Evaluation of Conductive Plastic Materials For
Use in Initiator Packaging
Recent developments Inplastlcs has led to the addition of
materials to the mix prior to the molding of plastics that renders them
more conductive to electrostatic charges. We were assigned the task of
evaluating some of these materials for possible use in the packaging
and handling of electric initiators.
In order to evaluate these materials we followed three plans of
evaluation that take into the account the generation and dissipation of
charge. Results of these evaluations are aimed at determining what
effects these materials may have on electroexplosive devices.
The materials that were involved in this study consisted of the
following:
i.
2.
Nylon - RC AS-2400, Fluorescent Orange Film
Polyethylene - RC AS-1200, Pink Film,
both products of the Richmond Corporation, 27427 Pacific
Avenue, Highland, California, 92346.
3. A commercial grade of Polyethylene film
The first test that was made involved the use of a small Van de
Graaff machine. Comparisons were made of the ability of the machine to
generate a potential with three belt materials: the standard rubber
belt provided with the machine, a belt made from the commercial poly-
ethylene and a belt made of the anti static polyethylene.
No meter was available to measure the very high potential that
was generated on the top of the Van de Graaff generator; and for this
reason, a gap was adjusted from the top of the machine to a grounded point
about one inch from the upper electrode so that a controlled discharge
D-I
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would occur at a relatively fixed potential and at a rate that is approxi-
mately proportional to the ability of the belt material to generate
charge. All three of the materials produced enough potential on the
large sphere of the Van de Graaff machine to produce sparking across
the gap. The rates of spark production were very different. The rubber
materials generated sparks at the highest rate, about ii0 per minute.
The ordinary polyethylene produced sparks at the rate of about 20 per
minute and the second material listed above produced about 5 to 6 per
minute. The rates appeared to besensltlve to atmospheric humidity.
Two types of tests involving resistance were made. The first
of these is illustrated in Figure D-I. This method of evaluation is
normally considered a measure of surface resistivity. A capacitor
of 500 picofarads was placed across the two aluminum blocks along with
a Sensitive Research electrostatic voltmeter. The time of decay of
the potential was measured as a means of determining the surface re-
sistivity of the conductive plastic sample. 500 plcofarads was chosen
because it is representative of the capacitance of the human being.
A second test was made by effectively using the sample as the
dielectric of a capacitor. The sample was placed on a large metal
ground plate and a 3 x 5 inch metal block was placed on top of the
sample. Once more a 500 picofarad capacitor was placed in parallel with
the sample and an electrostatic voltmeter placed in parallel with the
sample and the capacitor.
Results of these tests are indicated in Table D-I. Plots of the
time of discharge of the capacitor to 37% of the initial potential are
shown in Figure D-2.
Bulkproperties of the conductive plastics appear to change
rapidly with ambient relative humidity and at relatively low potentials.
The conductive nylon is two decades below the commercial polyethylene in
time to discharge to 37% of the initial potential. The AS polyethylene
is only one decade removed from the commercial polyethylene.
When 5000 volts is used as the initial potential, it appears that
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DISCHARGE MEASUREMENTS ON CQNDUCTIVE PLASTIC MATERIALS
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Test Nylon Polyethylene
Humidity RC-AS-2400 RC-AS-1200
Time
(sec)
Polyethylene
Commercial
Resistance Time Resistance Time Resistance
(ohms) (sec) (ohms) (sec) (ohms)
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
E = 140 volts
o
Surface
80% 68
Bulk
80% 1.6
72% ii
55% 44
i0 II I0 I0 i0 II1.37 x 31 6 x 88 1.62 x
3.13 x 109 54 18.6 x i0 I0 171 3.4 x i0 II
i0 I0 1012 10132 x 1440 2.74 x 5460 1.03 x
1010 10138.7 x 5400 1.07 x Not Measured
Eo = 5000 volts
Surface
45% 825
20% 1510
10121.62 x +3600* + 5.4 x 1012. 3600* 5.4 x 1012.
1012 1012 10122.9 x 1960 3.88 x 2280 4.5 x
Bulk
lO 1245% f 548 i.i x 3600* 5.4 x 1012.
20% % 590 1.16 x 1012 3600* 5.4 x 1012.
* The reading was in excess of this time and probably much longer in duration
or larger in resistance than is indicated.
% The material discharged immediately and could not build up to the potential
of the source.
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relative humidity has a lesser effect. This is illustrated by the rela-
tively flat line in Figure D-2. The RC AS-2400 would not accept a charge
when it was used as the dielectric of a capacitor (bulk properties).
It immediately discharged the source to a potential below i00 volts that
was not readable on the voltmeter.
Surface resistivity appears to be fairly uniform for all of the
materials tested including the Commercial polyethylene. Part of this
involves the instrumentation that was used to evaluate the surface re-
sistivity. It is believed that there was considerable leakage in shunt
with the measuring and discharge system and that this made differences
in the properties of the materials difficult to measure. Differences did
show themselves at the lower voltage as is evidenced by the first row of
resistance readings of Table D-I.
The results of these tests do not show large differences between
the conductive or antistatic materials. It appears that more is involved
in the action of these materials than is evident from the usual electrical
measurements. It has not been possible to build up a charge on the anti-
static materials by the conventional rubbing processes in comparison to
the commercial grades of polyethylene. Additional measurements and addi-
tional studies are required on these types of materials in general.
Since they do not appear to generate a static charge when used
in the normal handling methods, they appear to be better for use with
explosive devices than conventional untreated plastic materials.
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